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Abstract The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic pro-
tocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the ac-
tions of the adversary and the protocol entities. This allows a matching model
to be used in both a machine-generated analysis and a human-generated compu-
tational proof. Using a protocol of Jakobsson and Pointcheval as a case study,
it is demonstrated that flaws in the protocol could have been found with this ap-
proach, providing evidence that the combination of human and computer analy-
sis can be more effective than either alone. As well as finding the known flaw,
previously unknown flaws in the protocol are discovered by the automatic anal-
ysis.
1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are fundamental security tools for electronic com-
munications and a high level of assurance is needed in the correctness of such
protocols. Techniques to verify the correctness of security proofs for cryp-
tographic protocols have been directed in two distinct directions, namely the
formal methods approach [1, 4] and the computational complexity approach [5,
6, 10, 17].
In the formal methods approach, emphasis is placed on model checking
and automatic theorem proving. Usually the abstract formal specification is in
the tradition of the model of Dolev and Yao [12]. This means that a ‘black
box’ model of cryptographic operations is used, which ignores different cryp-
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tographic properties and possible loss of partial information. Therefore it is
quite possible to have flaws in protocols that were proven secure in the Dolev-
Yao sense [3, 15] and we cannot be entirely confident that such a protocol can
be implemented securely.
In the computational complexity approach, emphasis is placed on a proven
reduction from the problem of breaking the protocols to another problem be-
lieved to be hard. Such proofs are invariably generated by humans. Application
of the computational complexity approach to protocol analysis was initiated by
Bellare and Rogaway in 1993, with a proof for a simple two party entity au-
thentication and key exchange protocol [6]. They formally defined a model of
adversary capabilities with an associated definition of security. Since then, the
model has been further revised several times. In 1995, Bellare and Rogaway
analysed a three-party server-based key distribution protocol [7] using an ex-
tension to the 1993 model. The most recent revision to the model was proposed
in 2000 by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [5], hereafter referred to as the
BPR2000 model.
A complete mathematical proof with respect to cryptographic definitions
provides a strong assurance that a protocol is behaving as desired. However,
the difficulty of obtaining correct computational proofs of security has been
illustrated dramatically by the well-known problem with the OAEP mode for
public key encryption [17]. Although OAEP was one of the most widely used
and implemented algorithms, it was several years after the publication of the
original proof that a problem was found (and subsequently fixed in the case
of RSA). Problems with proofs of protocol security have occurred too. In this
paper, we will use the original version of a protocol due to Jakobsson and
Pointcheval [13] which carried a claimed proof in the Bellare-Rogaway model
but was later found to be flawed by Wong and Chan [18].
In recent years a number of researchers have started to recognize the dis-
parity in the two different approaches to protocol analysis. Previous efforts in
unifying the two domains have been devoted towards providing abstract mod-
els of cryptographic primitives which are suitable for machine analysis and yet
can be proven to be functionally equivalent (in some well-defined sense) to the
real cryptographic primitives that they model. Abadi and Rogaway [2] started
this trend, and more recently comprehensive efforts have been under way in
two different but related projects by Canetti [9] and by Backes et al. [3].
In this work we take a different, more pragmatic, approach to the prob-
lem. We are motivated by the observation that so far no researchers have
tried to utilize the communication and adversary model from computational
proofs in a machine specification and analysis. Although we cannot capture
the complexity-based definitions for security and cryptographic primitives, we
can ensure that the same protocol and adversary capabilities are specified in
both the human-generated proofs and the machine analysis. In other words,
rather than trying to unify the two approaches, we treat them as complemen-
tary but ensure that, as far as possible, they are analysing the same objects.
Our thesis is that the human proof will take care of the cryptographic details
lacking in the machine analysis, while the machine analysis will help to ensure
that human error resulting in basic structural mistakes is avoided.
We provide a formal specification and machine analysis of the adversary
model from the BPR2000 model as shown in Figure 1. The Bellare-Rogaway
model is the most widely used model for human-generated security proofs of
protocols. As a case study we analyse the protocol of Jakobsson and Pointcheval.
The original version appeared in the unpublished pre-proceedings of Financial
Cryptography 2001 with a claimed proof of security in the Bellare-Rogaway
model. Nevertheless, a flaw in the protocol was discovered by Wong and Chan.
In the published paper [13], the flaw in the protocol has been fixed.
Our choice of formalism for this work is Asynchronous Product Automata
(APA), a universal state-based formal method [16]. APA is supported by the
Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT) [14] for analysis and verifi-
cation of cooperating systems and communicating automata. Once the possible
state transitions of each automaton have been specified, SHVT can be used to
automatically search the state space of the model. SHVT provides a reachabil-
ity graph of the explored states. In our APA specification, the abstract commu-
nication model captures the representation of the protocol, the message trans-
mission, and the communication channels. The automated state space analyses
performed with SHVT reveal the known attack on the Jakobsson-Pointcheval
protocol and also two other previously unpublished attacks.
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Figure 1. Our proposed approach
This work differs significantly from related earlier work of Boyd and Viswa-
nathan [8], as their formal specification did not capture the entire Bellare- Ro-
gaway model. In addition, no automatic searching was performed and no new
attack was revealed in their earlier work.
We regard the main contributions of this paper to be confirmation of the fea-
sibility of using formal specifications to identify problems in human-generated
computational complexity proofs, demonstration of the use of SHVT in an au-
tomated manner to find unknown attacks in protocols, and a re-usable frame-
work for automatic analysis of protocols proven secure in the BPR2000 model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly ex-
plains the adversarial model used in our formal specification framework and
the Bellare-Rogaway adversarial model. Section 3 describes the original ver-
sion of the mutual authentication and key exchange protocol (MAKEP) due to
Jakobsson and Pointcheval, and the hijacking attack first mentioned by Wong
and Chan. Section 4 briefly outlines the state-based APA specification, fol-
lowed by the results of the protocol analysis using SHVT. Section 5 presents
the conclusions.
2. Overview of Our Formal Specification Framework
In this section, we present an overview of the BPR2000 model, followed
by a definition of an adversary in our APA formal specification framework.
We follow the general adversarial formalism of the BPR2000 model, except
that the probabilistic characteristics of the BPR2000 adversary are not explic-
itly modelled in our formal specification due to the deterministic nature of
SHVT. However, since our thesis is that the human proof will take care of the
cryptographic details lacking in the machine analysis, this does not present an
obstacle to our protocol analysis.
2.1 The BPR2000 Model
The BPR2000 model defines provable security for entity authentication and
key distribution goals. In the model, the adversary ABR is a probabilistic
machine that has the capability to read, delay, replay, modify, delete, and fab-
ricate messages between communicating principals and to start new instances
of communicating principals. ABR controls all the communications that take
place between parties by interacting with a set of oracles at any time in any
order. Each of the oracles represents an instance of a principal (ΠiU denotes
the i-th instance of a principal U ) in a specific protocol run. The predefined
oracle queries are described informally as follows.
The SendClient and SendServer queries allow the adversary to simulate
the actions of the principals according to the protocol by sending some
message of her choice to any client or server oracle at will. The client or
server oracle, upon receiving the query, will compute what the protocol
specification demands and send back the response.
The Reveal query allows the adversary to expose an old session key
which has been previously accepted. Any oracle receiving this query,
if it has accepted and holds some session key, will send this session key
back to the adversary. This query enables the modelling of the require-
ment that loss of a session key should only affect the session that used
the key, and not any other session. In addition, some session keys may
not need to be kept secret after the completion of a session, e.g. keys
used for message authentication.
The Corrupt query allows the adversary to corrupt any principal at will,
and thereby learn the complete internal state of the corrupted principal.
The Corrupt query also gives the adversary the ability to overwrite the
long-lived key of the corrupted principal with any value of her choice.
This query can be used to model the real world scenarios of an insider
cooperating with the adversary and an insider who has been completely
compromised by the adversary.
The Test query is the only oracle query that does not correspond to any
of ABR’s abilities. If the oracle being asked a Test query has accepted
with some session key, and depending on the randomly chosen bit b,
ABR is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn ran-
domly from the session key distribution. ABR may only make one Test
query during a game simulation. The use of the Test query is explained
in Section 2.1.3.
The definition of security depends on the notions of partnership of oracles
and indistinguishability. The definition of partnership is used in the definition
of security to restrict the adversary’s Reveal and Corrupt queries to oracles that
are not partners of the oracle whose key the adversary is trying to guess.
2.1.1 Denition of Partnership. Partnership is defined using the no-
tion of session identifiers (SIDs). SIDs are defined as the concatenation of
messages exchanged during the particular protocol run in question. An oracle
who has accepted will hold the associated session key, a SID and a partner
identifier (PID).
Definition 1 Two oracles, ΠiA and Π
j
B , are partners if, and only if, both
oracles have accepted the same session key with the same SID , have agreed on
the same set of principals (i.e., the initiator and the responder of the protocol),
and no other oracles besides ΠiA and Π
j
B have accepted with the same SID .
2.1.2 Denition of Freshness. Definition 2 describes the notion of
freshness, which depends on the notion of partnership in Definition 1.
Definition 2 Oracle ΠiA is fresh (or it holds a fresh session key) at the end
of execution, if, and only if, oracle ΠiA has accepted with or without a partner
oracle ΠjB , both oracle Π
i
A and its partner oracle Π
j
B (if such a partner oracle
exists) are unopened (i.e., have not been sent a Reveal query), and none of the
players are corrupted (i.e., no one has been sent a Corrupt query).
2.1.3 Denition of Security. Security is defined using the game G,
played between a malicious adversary ABR and a collection of oracles. ABR
runs G and is able to send any oracle queries at will. At some point during G,
ABR will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query
to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. Depending on the randomly
chosen bit b,ABR is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn
randomly from the session key distribution. ABR continues making any oracle
queries of its choice. Eventually, ABR terminates the game and outputs a bit
b′, which is its guess of the value of b.
Success ofABR is measured in terms ofABR’s advantage in distinguishing
whether ABR receives the real key or a random value. ABR wins if, after
asking a Test query, ABR’s guess bit b′ equals the bit b selected during the
Test query. If the advantage of ABR is denoted by AdvABR , then AdvABR =
2× Pr[b = b′]− 1.
Definition 3 A protocol is secure if both the following requirements are
satisfied: (1) when the protocol is run between two oracles in the absence of a
malicious adversary, the two oracles accept the same key, and (2) for all proba-
bilistic, polynomial-time adversariesABR, the advantage AdvABR is negligible
and the advantage that any adversary has in violating entity authentication is
negligible. An adversary is said to violate entity authentication if some fresh
oracle terminates (i.e., accepts a session key and completes the protocol) with
no partner.
2.2 Our Formal Specification Framework
In our formal framework using APA specification, protocol principals are
modelled as a family of elementary automata. The various state spaces of
the principals are modelled as a family of state sets. The channel through
which the elementary automaton communicates is modelled by the addition
and removal of messages from the shared state component Network, which
is initially empty. Each of the elementary automata only has access to the
particular state components to which it is connected. In addition to the regular
protocol principals, we specify an adversaryA, which has access to the shared
state component Network, but no access to the internal states of the principals.
Adopting the adversary formalism from the BPR2000 model, we consider
an adversary A who is able to intercept messages in the Network, swap data
components in the intercepted messages to form new messages, remove mes-
sages from the Network, or fabricate new messages. A is then able to send
these messages to the client or server oracles via the Network (corresponding
to SendClient and SendServer queries in the BPR2000 model). Also, once an
oracle, ΠiU , has accepted and holds a session key, the (SID ,PID) pair associ-
ated with that oracle becomes visible to the adversary A via the shared state
component Transcript. If A so chooses, A is then able to obtain the session
key of ΠiU via a Reveal query or a Corrupt query. The shared state component
Transcript also contains a log of all sent messages and is equivalent to a tran-
script in the Bellare-Rogaway model. The graphical illustration of MAKEP in
APA specification is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Graphical illustration of MAKEP in APA specification
The advantage of ABR is not explicitly modelled in our specification due
to its probabilistic nature. Instead of modelling the attack to distinguish be-
tween the real key and a random value, we simplify the game G defined in
Section 2.1.3 by assuming that AdvABR = 1 if ABR can obtain a fresh session
key, otherwise AdvABR = 0. Consequently, some attacks might be left out
while analysing the game G. However, since our aim is to leave computational
matters to the human-generated proof, this does not present an obstacle to our
protocol analysis.
When using formal specification tools, insecurity is commonly specified in
terms of the unreachability of the desired states or reachability of insecure
states and a “secure” protocol in a formal specification does not necessarily
imply that the protocol is secure. Hence, we find it more natural to define in-
security in our formal framework as given in Definition 4. Protocols proven
insecure in our formal specification model will also be insecure in the Bellare-
Rogaway model. Definition 4 depends on the notions of partnership in Defini-
tion 1 and freshness in Definition 2.
Definition 4 A protocol is insecure in our formal framework if:
1 two fresh non-partner oracles accept the same key, or
2 some fresh oracle accepts some key, which has been exposed (i.e., is
known to A), or
3 some fresh oracle accepts and terminates with no partner.
3. Original Version of Jakobsson-Pointcheval MAKEP
Client A (a, ga) Server B (b, gb)
rA, tA ∈R Zq , K = y
rA
B = g
brA
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Figure 3. Original version of MAKEP
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Figure 4. A hijacking attack on original version of MAKEP
There are two communicating principals in MAKEP shown in Figure 3,
namely the server and the client of limited computing resources, A. The secu-
rity goals of the protocol are mutual authentication and key agreement between
the two communicating principals. A and B are each assumed to know the
public key of the other party. Prior to the protocol run, A can pre-compute the
session key k which is a hash of the shared secret with B using Diffie-Hellman
key exchange, the value r used for client authentication and B’s public key
(i.e., k = h0(gb, grA , K)). In the protocol, the notation rA ∈R Zq denotes that
rA is randomly drawn from Zq.
Despite claims of the original version of MAKEP being proven secure in the
Bellare-Rogaway model, a hijacking attack on the protocol was discovered by
Wong and Chan [18] which breaks the client authentication as shown in Fig-
ure 4. The result of the attack is that B actually shares a key with a malicious
adversary A when B believes the key is being shared with A. This attack is
revealed by the SHVT analysis explained in Section 4.2.1.
4. Protocol Specification and Analysis
In this section, using the original version of MAKEP as a case study, we
specify the protocol using APA. We demonstrate that SHVT can be used to find
the hijacking attack first mentioned by Wong and Chan, and two previously
unknown flaws in the protocol. For the remainder of this section, E denotes
the adversary.
4.1 Protocol Specification
Examples of some basic types
Agents ::= set of all the principals (i.e., A, B) and A (i.e., E)
A State ::= A’s internal state
A Keys ::= set of A’s public and private keys
Accepted ::= set of all oracles who had accepted (visible to A)
Examples of some functions
gFunction(g, m) ::= denotes gm, where m is some value (e.g.,
gFunction(g, rA) denotes grA shown in Figure 3)
verifyGFun(m1, m2) ::= the verification function used to verify if
gm1
′ ?
= gm2
′
for some m1′ and m2′. (e.g.,
verifyGFun(gFunction(gFunction(g, a), b),
gFunction(gFunction(g, b), a)) will return true)
Figure 5. Examples of basic types and functions
The first phase of our formal specification is to specify the basic types and
the functions as shown in Figure 5. In order to increase run-time efficiency,
and to overcome storage restrictions, we replace each unique data item in any
message with a unique numeric message identifier (MID) in our specification.
For example, the message in message flow 1 sent by A consists of two data
items, grA and r, whose message identifiers are MID = 1 and MID = 2
respectively. SID is then the concatenation of these unique MIDs (e.g. SID =
[1, 2, . . .]) instead of the concatenation of messages from the BPR2000 model.
Initial State of the Original Version. The initial state of MAKEP is shown
in Figure 6. The left-hand column shows the SHVT specification of the various
initial states, and an explanation is given in the right-hand column.
A State:= {(B,server),(start,B),
(publicK,gFunction(b),B)};
A knows that B is a server, can
start a protocol session run with
B (indicated by the keyword
start), and knows the public
key of B (i.e., gb).
A Keys:= {(publicK,gFunction(a)),(privateK,a)}; A owns a key pair (a,ga).
B State:= {(A,agent),(respond,A),
(publicK,gFunction(a),A)};
B knows that A is an agent, can
respond to a protocol run initi-
ated by A (indicated by the key-
word respond), and knows the
public key of A (i.e., ga).
B Keys:= {(publicK,gFunction(b)),(privateK,b)}; B owns a key pair (b,gb).
E State:= {(publicK,gFunction(a),A),publicK,
gFunction(b),B)};
A(Eve) knows the public keys
of A and B.
Network:= ∅; Network is initially empty.
Transcript:= ∅; Transcript is initially empty.
Figure 6. Initial state
Step 1 of the Original Version. Starting from the initial state shown in
Figure 6, SHVT computes all reachable states. The first state transition of
the initiator client A is explained in Figure 7. To ensure uniqueness of the
values rA, tA and MID in the APA specification, once these values are as-
signed, they are removed from the pre-defined sets new random nonce and
MIDs . We assume that (SIDA,PIDA) cannot be modified by the adversary.
The (SIDA,PIDA) tuple is required to enable the SHVT analysis to define
partnership.
A Malicious State Transistion. An active adversary A is able to intercept
message (grA , r)meant for B from A, to fabricate a new message (grE , r) and
to send the fabricated message (grE , r) to B via the Network. This state transi-
tion as shown in Figure 8 is equivalent to a SendServer query in the BPR2000
model. Due to space contraints, details of other possible state transitions for
the adversary and the protocol are omitted.
4.2 Protocol Analysis
Having formally specified the protocol in APA, we analyse the protocol
specification using SHVT as shown in the sections below. The analyses were
run on a Pentium IV 2.4 GHz computer with 512 Mb of RAM and the anal-
def trans pattern A step 1 Definition of a state transition
B,gb,rA,tA,rAA,r,k,k2,K,SIDA,PIDA,MID Variables used in this step
[’start’,B] ? A State, Precondition: A can start protocol run
with B.
[B,’server’] ? A State, Precondition: A knows B is the server.
[’publicK’,gb,B] ? A State, Precondition: A knows B’s public key
gb. (gb is a variable that takes the value
gFunction(b).)
rAA « new random nonce, Random unique nonce values are drawn
rA := head(rAA), from the pre-defined set
tA := head(tail(rAA)), new random nonce and assigned to rA
tail(tail(rAA)) » new random nonce, and tA respectively.
MID « SIDs, Random unique MIDs are drawn from the
tail(tail(MID)) » SIDs, pre-defined set SIDs are assigned to grA
and r respectively.
SIDA := [head(MID),head(tail(MID))], SID is the concatenation of these unique
MIDs .
PIDA := B, PID of A is set to B.
K := [’KFunction’,gb,rA], A computes a new K = (gb)rA .
k := [’hash0’,gb,[’gFunction’,g,rA],K], A computes the new shared secret k us-
ing the hash function h0 (i.e., k =
h0(g
b, grA , K)).
r := [’hash1’,[’gFunction’,g,tA]], A computes r = h1(gtA).
k2 := [’hash2’,gb,[’gFunction’,g,rA],K], A computes k2 = h2(gb, grA , K).
[’start’,B] « A State, A initiated one session with B, so one tu-
ple enabling a session to start is removed
from A’s state.
[SIDA,PIDA,[tA,k,k2,K]] » A State, A stores the information that she shares
with B for this protocol run.
(A,B, [head(SIDA1), head(tail(SIDA1))], A sends message grA , r to the Network.
[[’gFunction’,g, rA], r]) » Network;
Figure 7. State transition - step 1
ysis statistics are shown in Figure 9. We set the break condition to terminate
the SHVT analysis if any of the requirement(s) in Definition 4 are violated.
The attack sequence and the internal states can be examined by viewing the
reachability graph produced by SHVT.
For run-time efficiency, and to avoid enormous branching factors in the
search space, we restrict the actions of the adversary so that certain actions
are possible for only some message types. Running SHVT with adversaries
having various restrictions and also restricting A to only two protocol runs
results in SHVT finding the attacks shown in Figures 4, 10, and 11.
def trans pattern E SendServer Definition of a state transition
(ga,gb,A,B,M,SIDE,S,rE) Variables used in this step
[’publicK’,ga,A] ? E State, Precondition: A knows A’s public key.
(’publicK’,gb,B) ? E State, Precondition: A knows B’s public key.
[A,’agent’] ? E State, Precondition: A knows A exists.
[B,’server’] ? E State, Precondition: A knows B exists.
A 6= B, Precondition: A and B are two different
principals.
(A,B,S,M) ? Network, Precondition: Checks if there exists any
message from A intended for B in the net-
work.
rAA « new random nonce, Random unique nonce values are drawn
rA := head(rAA), from the pre-defined set
tA := head(tail(rAA)), new random nonce and assigned to rA
tail(tail(rAA)) » new random nonce, and tA respectively.
SIDE « SIDs, Random unique MIDs are drawn from the
tail(tail(SIDE)) » SIDs, pre-defined set SIDs and assigned to grE
and rE respectively.
[’fabricated’,’mf1’,[head(SIDE),elem(2,S)],
[[’gFunction’,g, head(rE)]]» E State,
A stores information in her internal state.
(A,B,[head(SIDE),elem(2,S)], [[’gFunc-
tion’, g,head(rE)], elem(2,M)])» Network;
A sends a fabricated message to B via the
Network.
Figure 8. A malicious state transition
Protocol Analysis # Players # Runs # Nodes Run-Time Flaws?
Hijacking Attack 2 1 34 2 secs Yes
New Attack 1 2 2 144 3 secs Yes
New Attack 2 2 2 1538 79 secs Yes
Figure 9. Analysis statistics
4.2.1 Hijacking Attack. State space analysis performed in the SHVT
analysis reveals that both requirements 2 and 3 of Definition 4 can be violated.
This attack was first mentioned by Wong and Chan [18] as shown in Figure 4.
4.2.2 New Attack 1. State space analysis in SHVT reveals that require-
ment 1 of Definition 4 is violated. The internal state of the final node in the
reachability graph reveals that the following four oracles have accepted some
session key: Π[1,2,7,10,12])A belonging to A and having SID = [1, 2, 7, 10, 12]
accepted h0(grA1, gtA1, (grA1)tA1), Π
[3,4,9,8,11])
A belonging to A and having
SID = [3, 4, 9, 8, 11] accepted h0(grA1, gtA2, (grA1)tA2), Π
[1,4,7,8,11])
B be-
longing to B and having SID = [1, 4, 7, 8, 11] accepted h0(gtA1, grA1, (gtA1)
rA1), and Π[3,2,9,10,12])B belonging to B and having SID = [3, 2, 9, 10, 12] ac-
cepted h0(gtA1, grA2, (gtA2)rA1). By Definition 1, none of these oracles have
any partner oracles since their SIDs are different. However, we observe that
the pairs (Π[1,2,7,10,12])A , Π
[1,4,7,8,11])
B ) and (Π
[3,4,9,8,11])
A , Π
[3,2,9,10,12])
B ) have ac-
cepted with the same session keys as shown in Figure 10.
A (a, ga) A B (b, gb)
rA,1, tA,1 ∈R Zq
KA,1 = y
rA,1
B = g
brA,1
kA,1 = h0(g
b, grA,1 , KA,1)
r1 = h1(g
tA,1)
k2(S1(A)) = h2(g
b, grA,1 , KA,1)
grA,1 , r1
−→
rA,2, tA,2 ∈R Zq
KA,2 = y
rA,2
B = g
brA,2
kA,2 = h0(g
b, grA,2 , KA,2)
r2 = h2(g
tA,2)
k2(S2(A)) = h2(g
b, grA,2 , KA,2)
grA,2 , r2
−→
grA,1 , r2
−→ K1 = (g
rA(1) )b
grA,2 , r1
−→ K2 = (g
rA(2) )b
k2,1, e1
←− k2,1 = h2(g
b, grA,1 , K1)
e1 ∈R {0, 1}
k
k2,2, e2
←− k2,2 = h2(g
b, grA,2 , K2)
k2(S1(A))
?
= k2,1
k2,1, e2
←− e2 ∈R {0, 1}
k
k2(S2(A))
?
= k2,2
k2,2, e1
←−
d1 = tA,1 − ae2 mod q
d1−→
d1−→ r2
?
= h1(g
d1(ga)e2)
d2 = tA,2 − ae1 mod q
d2−→
d2−→ r1
?
= h1(g
d2(ga)e1)
kAB(1) = h0(g
b, grA,1 , (gb)rA,1) kBA(1) = h0(g
b, grA,1 , (grA,1)b)
kAB(2) = h0(g
b, grA,2 , (gb)rA,2) kBA(2) = h0(g
b, grA,2 , (grA,2)b)
Figure 10. New attack 1
This implies that by revealing one oracle in any pair, the adversaryA is able
to distinguish the session key held by the other oracle in the same pair. Hence,
the protocol state is not secure since the adversary A can find a fresh session
key. In addition, mutual authentication is violated since both the client and
server oracles terminate without a partner.
The attack sequence is shown in Figure 10, and is revealed by following
the reachability graph to the insecure state. The attack sequence is as follows:
the adversary A intercepts and removes the two original messages from the
Network, swaps the components in these two messages to form two new mes-
sages, and sends these two modified messages to B impersonating A via the
Network. B, upon receiving these two messages, will respond as per the pro-
tocol specification. A intercepts the messages in protocol flow 2 sent by B to
A, and swaps the components in these two messages to form new messages
and again sends these two modified messages back to the Network, imperson-
ating B. If A authenticates the server, she will respond with some value d as
per the protocol specification. B receives the messages d1 and d2 in protocol
flow 3. Once some oracle has accepted and holds some session key, the partic-
ular (SID ,PID) pair will be made visible to the adversary via the shared state
component Transcript. A is then able to send Reveal queries to the oracles of
B, and receive the session keys held by the associated fresh oracles of A.
A (a, ga) A B (b, gb)
rA,1, tA,1 ∈R Zq
KA,1 = y
rA,1
B = g
brA,1
kA,1 = h0(g
b, grA,1 , KA,1)
r1 = h1(g
tA,1)
k2(S1(A)) = h2(g
b, grA,1 , KA,1)
grA,1 , r1
−→
rA,2, tA,2 ∈R Zq
KA,2 = y
rA,2
B = g
brA,2
kA,2 = h0(g
b, grA,2 , KA,2)
r2 = h2(g
tA,2)
k2(S2(A)) = h2(g
b, grA,2 , KA,2)
grA,2 , r2
−→
grA,1 , rE
−→ K1 = (g
rA,1)b
grE , r1
−→ K2 = (g
rE )b
grE , r2
−→ K3 = (g
rE )b
grA,2 , rE
−→ K4 = (g
rA,2)b
k2,1, e1
←− k2,1 = h2(g
b, grA,1 , K1)
e1 ∈R {0, 1}
k
...
...
k2,4, e4
←− k2,4 = h2(g
b, grA,2 , K4)
k2(S1(A))
?
= k2,1
k2,1, e2
←− e4 ∈R {0, 1}
k
k2(S2(A))
?
= k2,4
k2,4, e3
←−
d1 = tA,1 − ae2 mod q
d1−→
d1−→ r
E ?= h1(g
d1(ga)e2)
d2 = tA2 − ae3 mod q
d2−→
d2−→ r
E ?= h1(g
d2(ga)e3)
kAB(1) = h0(g
b, grA,1 , (gb)rA,1) kBA(1) = h0(g
b, grE , (grE )b)
kAB(2) = h0(g
b, grA,2 , (gb)rA,2) kBA(2) = h0(g
b, grE , (grE )b)
Figure 11. New attack 2
4.2.3 New Attack 2. State space analysis in SHVT reveals that require-
ments 2 and 3 of Definition 4 are violated and the internal state of the final
node in the reachability graph reveals that fresh oracles of B, Π[3,2,5,6,9]B and
Π
[5,2,7,8,16]
B , have accepted with no partner. In addition, the adversary A is
able to compute both the session keys accepted by B since both session keys
are computed based on the random number grE chosen by the adversary A.
Hence A is able to decrypt all messages sent by B to A encrypted with these
session keys. The attack sequence is shown in Figure 11, and is revealed by
following the reachability graph to the insecure state.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We have described a formal model which can complement computational
complexity proofs in the Bellare-Rogaway model. In our model the adversary
capabilities match those in the Bellare-Rogaway model. Through a detailed
study of the Jakobsson-Pointcheval protocol we have demonstrated that this
approach can capture structural flaws in protocols. We were able to find both
existing and previously unknown flaws in the protocol using SHVT. Such a
tool is useful in checking the hand-generated Bellare-Rogaway proofs. We
may speculate that if Jakobsson and Pointcheval had access to such a tool when
constructing their original proof of security they could have spotted the flaw in
the protocol.
Further directions for this work include extending it to other cryptographic
protocols with proofs of security in order to gain better confidence in their cor-
rectness. In so doing we should be able to re-use the basic adversary model
already developed. We would also like to explore other computational com-
plexity models, in particular the Canetti-Krawczyk modular approach [10], to
gain a better understanding of the uses of a complementary model. Finally,
we would like to make use of the recent work of Canetti et al. [9, 11] and/or
Backes et al. [4] in order to incorporate abstract cryptographic properties with
a sound computational basis.
Acknowledgments
Thanks are due to Dr Carsten Rudolph of Fraunhofer Institute for Secure
Telecooperation for his invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this paper and
also the anonymous referees for their critical feedback.
References
[1] M. Abadi and A.D. Gordon. A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus.
In 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 36–47. ACM
Press, 1997.
[2] M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational
Soundness of Formal Encryption). In IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Com-
puter Science - IFIP TCS2000, pages 3–22. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[3] M. Backes and C. Jacobi. Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of
Security Protocols. In 20th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer
Science - STACS 2003, pages 310–329. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[4] M. Backes, C. Jacobi, and B. Pfitzmann. Deriving Cryptographically Sound Implemen-
tations Using Composition and Formally Verified Bisimulation. In Formal Methods -
Getting IT Right, pages 310–329. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[5] M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway. Authenticated Key Exchange Secure
Against Dictionary Attacks. In Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt, pages 139 – 155.
Springer-Verlag, 2000. LNCS Volume 1807/2000.
[6] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. In Advances in
Cryptology, pages 110–125. Springer-Verlag, 1993. LNCS Volume 773/1993.
[7] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Provably Secure Session Key Distribution: The Three Party
Case. In 27th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 57–66. ACM Press,
1995.
[8] C. Boyd and K. Viswanathan. Towards a Formal Specification of the Bellare-Rogaway
Model for Protocol Analysis. In Formal Aspects of Security - FASec 2002, pages 209–
223. British Computer Society Press, Dec 2002.
[9] R. Canetti. Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Pro-
tocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067, 2000.
[10] R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk. Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for
Building Secure Channels. In Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 2001:, pages 453–
474. Springer-Verlag, May 2001. LNCS Volume 2045/2001.
[11] R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk. Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and
Secure Channels (Extended Version). Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/059, 2002.
[12] D. Dolev and A.C. Yao. On the Security of Public Key Protocols. IEEE Transaction of
Information Technology, 29(2):198–208, 1983.
[13] M. Jakobsson and D. Pointcheval. Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol
for Low Power Devices. In Financial Cryptography, pages 178–195. Springer-Verlag,
2001.
[14] P. Ochsenschl-ager, J. Repp, and R. Rieke. Abstraction and a Verification Method for
Cooperating Systems. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Articial Intelligence,
12:447–459, Jun 2000.
[15] B. Pfitzmann, M. Schunter, and M. Waidner. Cryptographic Security of Reactive Sys-
tems. In Steve Schneider and Peter Ryan, editors, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Com-
puter Science, volume 32. Reed Elsevier, 2000.
[16] R. Rieke. Implementing the APA Model for the Symmetric Needham-Schroeder Proto-
col in State Transition Pattern Notation in the SH Verification Tool. Technical report,
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Telecooperation SIT, 26 July 2002.
[17] V. Shoup. OAEP Reconsidered. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2001, pages
239–259. Springer-Verlag, 2001. LNCS Volume 2139/2001.
[18] D.S. Wong and A.H. Chan. Efficient and Mutually Authenticated Key Exchange for
Low Power Computing Devices. In Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt 2001. Springer-
Verlag, 2001.
